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THE DUTY TO SETTLE IN WTO DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT

Chios Carmody

ABSTRACT
WTO disputes form an important part of the way we think
about WTO law today. Nevertheless, given the fact that virtually all
of the disputes must, at some point or other, settle, this article
argues that an important — and perhaps even pre-eminent —
aspect of WTO law is the law of settlement. There is an actual duty
on parties in WTO law to resolve the cases they are involved in.
This is not a “hard” obligation in the sense of having to achieve a
specific result, but rather one of a softer, process-oriented variety.
This article examines the law of negotiation and settlement in
domestic labour law and Aboriginal law as a prelude to examining
the extent of this duty as developed in U.S. – Shrimp and U.S. –
Continued Suspension.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Thinking about WTO law today is dominated by WTO dispute
settlement. Since the WTO’s system of dispute settlement was first
activated 15 years ago the system has rendered over 300 decisions, appeals
and arbitration awards. These have provided both the dispute settlement
system and commentators with an illuminating source of jurisprudence on
many key points of WTO law.
At the same time, the spectacle of WTO dispute settlement has
provided the global public with imagery akin to that of private litigation.
Dispute settlement features identifiable “claimants” and “defendants”, rules
of procedure, requirements of evidence, written decisions, appeals, and
perhaps most importantly, remedies, or trade “sanctions”, that infer the
legal system actually has “teeth”. Taken together, these elements infer that
what the dispute settlement system has created is a trade “court”, and
indeed, WTO dispute settlement has been popularly described as such.1
The paradigm of litigation casts a long shadow on thinking about WTO
law at present. There is an implicit emphasis on the law’s tactical and
polemical aspects. Virtually every report begins with ritual references to
the standard of review, the burden of proof and treaty interpretation.2
This emphasis on litigation and adversarialism — on “dispute
settlement” — is at odds with another, less noted, aspect of WTO law —
that of “dispute settlement”, the duty on WTO member countries to
cooperate in resolving their differences. 3 This duty announces itself in
general terms in DSU Article 3.10, which requires that countries “engage in
dispute settlement procedures in good faith in an effort to resolve the
dispute.” Indeed, I will argue in this article that the objective of resolving
disputes is conceptually primate in the treaty and subsists throughout the
entire course of WTO litigation. As the arbitrator in U.S. – 1916 Act (22.6)
observed, “this obligation [to resolve disputes] applies to all stages of the
dispute, including during the implementation of the suspension of
obligations.”4 Thus, the popular polemical image of WTO law is matched
For instance, see Global Exchange, The WTO Erodes Human Rights Protections — Three Case
Studies (1999), http://www.globalexchange.org/campaigns/wto/CaseStudies.html (last visited Feb.
22, 2011).
2
These are all matters of vital interest to lawyers that the WTO Agreement itself is largely silent
about and which have had to be defined, and refined, by panels under the guidance of the Appellate
Body. See reference to this trinity of issues in Panel Report, U.S. – Continued Existence and
Application of Zeroing Methodology, WT/DS350/R (Oct. 1, 2008).
3
Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement, Note by the Secretariat: Concept, Forms and Effects of
Arbitration, MTN.GNG/NG13/W/20 (Feb. 22, 1988); the term “dispute” is defined as a specific
disagreement concerning a matter of fact, law or policy in which a claim or assertion by one party
is met with refusal, counterclaim or denial by another. Award of the Arbitrators, United States –
Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, n. 27, WT/DS160/ARB25/1, (Nov. 9, 2001).
4
Decision by the Arbitrators, U.S. – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, ¶ 9.1, WT/DS136/ARB (Feb. 24,
1

by an irenical counterpart.
Traditionally, however, little attention is paid to the duty to settle. This
is because of the overwhelming emphasis in WTO law on litigation and
because resolution of these complex disputes usually takes place “offstage”, that is, out of the public eye, many years after the dispute actually
commences. We tend to forget, or be uninterested in, the peaceful and
cooperative aspects of inter-state behaviour. They are routine and
humdrum, lacking in colourful histrionics that make litigation so
compelling. What grabs our attention is the ongoing parade of disputes and
the political theatre associated with them. Disputes like Bananas,
Hormones, 1916 Act, Pharmaceuticals, Cotton, and Sugar have each
garnered interest with their hyperbolic claims and had their “day in the
sun”. Less often do we pause to consider the fact that the real outcome of
these cases is settlement.
Recently, this settlement function has received some attention in the
course of settling two longstanding WTO disputes, EC – Bananas and EC
– Hormones. What I want to suggest in this article is that unlike domestic
private litigation, there is an actual obligation on parties in WTO law to
resolve the cases they bring. This is not a “hard” obligation in the sense of
having to achieve a specific result, but rather one of a softer, processoriented variety. Countries are required to engage with each other, to put
adequate resources towards the effort to settle, and to conduct themselves
in the negotiations in good faith. By comparison, domestic litigation may
favour settlement, but rarely does it oblige settlement. Instead, as will be
discussed, domestic litigation imposes obligations on lawyers, rules
concerning offers, costs consequences and other devices, to move parties
towards a resolution. WTO law goes a step or two further. It recognizes the
greater value in having parties actually resolve their differences.
Why? The obligation to settle disputes is attributable to an overarching
communitarian ethos that permeates the WTO Agreement. The treaty
creates a “community” of like-minded member countries which appreciate
— if not always expressly — that the community provides certain key
benefits that would be missing in the absence of agreement. The chief
benefit of the trade regime is certainty: it affords governments and
individuals the certainty of knowing that they will be treated in a certain
way.5 That certainty is likely to be disrupted, however, by disputes. The
2004).
5
See, for instance, Panel Report, China – Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts, ¶ 7.460,
WT/DS339 (July 18, 2008) (“[T]he main purpose and objective of the WTO Agreement and the
GATT 1994 is to maintain the security and predictability of reciprocal market access arrangements
manifested in tariff concessions. This, in our view, means that tariff concessions must be
interpreted to benefit both the importing Member, China, and exporting Members.”) (emphasis
added). There are other references in WTO case law to the importance of “security and
predictability”; for instance, see Panel Report, Argentina – Measures Affecting Imports of

treaty therefore stresses the need for members to reconcile and resolve their
differences, preferably in a way that is acceptable to the parties and the
WTO membership at large. Thus, countries do not fight simply to fight to
vindicate their own interest — as the polemical record might infer. They
fight and settle their disputes in a bid to further the common interest
protected under the treaty.
This obligation to settle may appear exceptional, but I will also argue
that it is simply a manifestation of a greater obligation to cooperate
identifiable in the law of many international organizations. The obligation
is sometimes explicitly mentioned in IO constitutive instruments, such as
Article 2.2 of the U.N. Charter which requires that “all members, in order
to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership,
shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance
with the present Charter.”6 Likewise, in the law of the European Union
(EU) there exist a number of clauses laying down duties of cooperation,
often referred to as duties of “community solidarity”, on member states
(Gemeinschaftstreue) and on EU organs (organtreue) that go beyond the
normal obligation to fulfil treaties in good faith.7 EU states and organs must
constantly remain aware of the need to act in a general way that reinforces
the underlying notion of community.8 Something similar occurs in WTO
law.
The neglect of this vitally important subject — the duty to settle — is
also due, at least in part, to the sense of disappointment and “failure” that
pervades the WTO today. In the public mind, if not the academic mind,
there is an overwhelming emphasis on the conclusion of “grand”
multilateral rounds of negotiations like the one concluded at Marrakesh in
April 1994. At that time the Uruguay Round led to the creation of the WTO
Agreement. The current round, the Doha Development Round, has been
ongoing since November 2001 and for many reasons, including ad hoc
deal-making, the proliferation of regional trade agreements, and continuing
Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other Items, ¶ 6.68, WT/DS56/R (Nov. 25, 1997); Panel Report,
Canada – Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the Exportation of Dairy Products, ¶
7.154, WT/DS103, 113/R (May 17, 1999); Appellate Body Report, EC – Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, Second Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by
Ecuador / Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States, ¶ 483,
WT/DS27AB/RW2/ECU and USA (Nov. 26, 2008) [hereinafter EC – Bananas Appellate Body
Report].
6
See discussion of the duty to cooperate in HENRY SCHERMERS & NIELS BLOKKER,
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW 108 (1995).
7
See John Temple Lang, Community Constitutional Law: Article 5 EEC Treaty, 27 COMM. MKT L.
REV. 645 (1990).
8
As Jan Klabbers puts it, “Much in the same way as marriage is somehow more than a mere
contractual arrangement, so too the creation of an organization is an act which involves not just the
normal good-faith duty to give effect to one’s commitments, but also a spirit of loyalty,
camaraderie and mutual respect.” JAN KLABBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONAL LAW 176 (2d ed., 2009).

differences over agriculture subsidies, there is little sign of its imminent
conclusion. Consequently, the entire treaty system seems to be clouded by
the fog of failure. This has, I will argue, bred an underlying sense of
dissatisfaction with the WTO system, as if it had accomplished nothing.
Too rarely is there real recognition of the tremendous amount that has
been achieved. We do not pause to consider the many “small” settlements
and agreements that have resulted from individual disputes.
Notwithstanding the failure of Doha to date, there are hundreds of them.9
Many specialists of WTO law will be familiar with the 2001 Doha
Declaration on Public Health and the 2003 Decision on Paragraph 6.10
Fewer, perhaps, will be aware of the way in which the WTO and its dispute
settlement system have been used for creative purposes to settle differences
over fishing management and wildlife protection, pesticide residues and
aircraft financing. WTO disputes have also had follow-on effects
elsewhere, for instance in UNESCO and the OECD.11 These follow directly
from the obligation to settle under WTO law and need to be remembered.
This experience must be considered in evaluating the success of the WTO
as a treaty and as an international organization.

II. THE NATURE OF WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
The obligation to settle in WTO law emanates from the special nature
of both WTO law and WTO dispute settlement. Whatever else may be said
about its many purposes, the chief purpose of WTO law is the “stability
and predictability” of concessions and commitments made under the WTO
Agreement.12 This is often assimilated within the concept of the “protection
For instance, see the Mutually Agreed Solution [hereinafter MAS], Korea – Measures concerning
the shelf-life of products, G/AG/W/8/Add.1 (Nov. 24, 1995); Minutes of the DSB meeting, United
States – Imposition of imports duties on automobiles from Japan under Section 301 and 304 of the
Trade Act of 1974, WT/DSB/M/6 (Aug. 28, 1995); MAS, Korea – Measures Concerning Bottled
Water, G/AG/W/14/Add.1 (May 6, 1996); Panel Report, EC – Trade Description of Scallops,
WT/DS7/12 (July 19, 1996); Panel Report, Japan – Import Quotas on Dried Laver and Seasoned
Laver, WT/DS323/5 (Jan. 27, 2006). These settlements have themselves occasionally been the
subject of WTO dispute settlement; see EC – Bananas Appellate Body Report, supra note 5, ¶¶
433-35. In that case, the arbitrator found that a temporary waiver regulating the EC’s banana quota
could not be interpreted to modify the EC’s existing tariff commitment on bananas.
10
See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 20 November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2; World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 2 September 2003,
WT/L/540.
11
For instance, see Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural
Expressions, Oct. 3-21, 2005, 45 I.L.M. 269, which was prompted, at least in part, by the outcome
in Panel Report, Canada – Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, WT/DS31/R (Mar. 14,
1997), and the Aircraft Sector Understanding on Export Credits for Civil Aircraft, OECD Doc.
TAD/PG(2007)4/FINAL (2007) which was prompted, at least in part, by the Brazil/Canada –
Aircraft dispute.
12
See SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 6. A further illustration was provided by the panel in
Panel Report, Colombia – Indicative Prices and Restrictions on Ports of Entry, ¶ 7.274,
9

of expectations”. 13 Accordingly, WTO law is understood to protect
expectations about the trade-related behaviour of governments, something
which has been interpreted as constituting a “public good” belonging to the
entire membership.14
The “public good” character of concessions and commitments had
consequences for dispute settlement. The historical record indicates that the
system which arose evolved naturally from the need identified under GATT
to resolve differences between countries. Originally, this took the form of
working parties set up to examine disputes between contracting parties.
Later, it developed more of a litigation-based approach that, as Robert
Hudec related, “satisf[ied] the legal instincts of the GATT
administrators”.15
The WTO dispute settlement system that came into being in 1995 was
part of a larger administrative structure, the Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB), whose function is to administer the WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU). The DSB is described as having: “[T]he authority to
establish panels, adopt panel and Appellate Body reports, maintain
surveillance of implementation of ruling and recommendations, and
authorize suspension of concessions and other obligations . . . . ”16
These references clarify that it is the DSB — not WTO panels or the
Appellate Body — that has the ultimate authority and responsibility to
discharge dispute settlement functions. The DSB fulfills these by meeting
regularly and by referring specific differences raised by countries in those
meetings to panels. These differences — referred to in WTO parlance as
WT/DS366/R (Apr. 27, 2009) [hereinafter Colombia – Ports of Entry Panel Report] where, in
discussing the variable nature of the Colombian law at issue it noted: “When also considering the
fact that the restrictions on port access have been imposed, extended and removed, then
subsequently reinstated, importers’ expectations and planning have undoubtedly been affected,
which has led importers to rearrange shipping schedules, in turn affecting scheduled importation of
subject goods arriving from Panama. In the Panel's view, all of these uncertainties, including access
to one seaport for extended periods of time and the likely increased costs that would arise for
importers operating under the constraints of the port restrictions, limit competitive opportunities for
imports arriving from Panama.”
13
See Appellate Body Report, EC – Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment, ¶ 109,
WT/DS62/AB/R (June 5, 1998); for application in the context of GATS, see Appellate Body
Report, U.S. – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶¶
159-160, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005).
14
A public good is a good that is non-rivalrous and non-excludable. Non-rivalry means that
consumption of the good by one individual does not reduce availability of the good for
consumption by others; and non-excludability that no one can be effectively excluded from using
the good. For further reference, see RAYMOND G. BATINA & TOSHIHIRO IHORI, PUBLIC GOODS:
THEORIES AND EVIDENCE (2005).
15
ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 79 (2d ed.,
1990).
16
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, art. 2.1, Annex 2, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M.
81 [hereinafter DSU].

“matters” — are the seed from which WTO disputes subsequently take
life.17
The important point to be gleaned from this arrangement is that the
task of panels and the Appellate Body is supplementary and assistive. DSU
Article 11 makes clear that the function of panels: “is to assist the DSB in
discharging its responsibilities . . . . ”18 This is described in greater detail as
follows: “[A] panel should make an objective assessment of the facts of the
matter before it . . . and make such other findings as will assist the DSB in
making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the
covered agreements.”
Not surprisingly, the traditional form of conclusion pronounced by a
panel is styled a “recommendation”, which is habitually adopted by the
DSB and constitutes the final pronouncement that countries must comply
with.
The auxiliary, problem-solving character of panels has noteworthy
consequences. Panels and the Appellate Body are not required to address
every claim before them.19 In some instances, it appears that panels and the
Appellate Body have judiciously avoided making findings that might
aggravate a dispute.20 And there is no way in WTO dispute settlement to
address counterclaims. 21 Thus, a number of the features of traditional
litigation that presume the adjustment of rights among the parties alone are
17

The standard terms of reference for WTO dispute settlement panels is spelled out in DSU Article
7.1 as being “To examine, in light of the relevant provisions . . . the matter referred to the DSB . . . .
” (italics added).
18
For instance, see references in Panel Report, Argentina – Definitive Safeguard Measure on
Imports of Preserved Peaches, ¶ 7.140, WT/DS238/R (Feb. 14, 2003).
19
This is made clear in references to “judicial economy”; id. ¶7.140. “Article 11 of the DSU
provides that the Panel's function is to assist the DSB in discharging its responsibilities under the
DSU and the covered agreements. It does not require us to examine all the legal claims made by
Chile. Our findings should assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings
provided for in the covered agreements. We are mindful of the approach of the Appellate Body in
U.S. – Wool Shirts and Blouses that we need only address those claims which we consider
necessary for the resolution of the matter between the parties. At the same time, we are mindful of
the balancing consideration expressed by the same body in Australia — Salmon that a panel has to
address those claims on which a finding is necessary in order to enable the DSB to make
sufficiently precise recommendations and rulings so as to allow for prompt compliance by a
Member with those recommendations and rulings in order to ensure effective resolution of disputes
to the benefit of all Members.”
20
A degree of circumspection can be observed, for instance, in Panel Report, Chile – Price Band
System and Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain Agricultural Products (21.5), ¶ 7.169,
WT/DS207/RW (Dec. 8, 2006) where a compliance panel found that Chile had failed to bring
certain laws into compliance with the WTO Agreement and noted that “It would flow
automatically that the measure is also in breach of Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement.
Notwithstanding the above, we do not feel that such additional finding is necessary in order to
resolve the dispute between the parties.” Likewise, in Colombia – Ports of Entry Panel Report,
supra note 12, ¶¶ 7.290-92, where the panel decided not to examine claims under GATT Art.
XIII:1 as this would not assist in resolving the dispute.
21
DSU Article 3.10 provides, “[i]t is understood that complaints and counter-complaints in regard
to distinct matters should not be linked.”

missing. The focus of the system is squarely on resolving disputes to the
benefit of members as a whole.
Several other provisions emphasize the dispute settlement system’s
collective and constructive nature. Perhaps the most important of these is
DSU Article 3.3, which states that:
The prompt settlement of situations in which a Member
considers that any benefits accruing to it directly or indirectly
under the covered agreements are being impaired by measures
taken by another Member is essential to the effective
functioning of the WTO and the maintenance of a proper
balance between rights and obligations of Members.
DSU Article 3.4 also provides that “Recommendations or rulings made
by the DSB shall be aimed at achieving a satisfactory settlement of the
matter . . . .”
Nevertheless, parties are not entitled to cooperate in settling matters in
any way that they please. Outcomes must meet some minimum threshold of
acceptability. This is evident in DSU Article 3.5: “All solutions to matters
formally raised under the consultation and dispute settlement provisions of
the covered agreements, including arbitration awards, shall be consistent
with those agreements . . . .”
The WTO dispute settlement system is thus keyed to adjusting rights
and obligations that belong, in some sense, to the entire WTO membership.
The resolution of a dispute is really about much more than the parties’
direct interests. It is about resolving differences that, if not settled, usually
have an impact on the entire membership’s common interest. 22 This is
perhaps most evident in DSU Article 3.6, which states: “Mutually agreed
solutions to matters formally raised under the consultation and dispute
settlement provisions of the covered agreements shall be notified to the
DSB and the relevant Councils and Committees, where any member may
raise any point relating thereto.”
The duty to settle is therefore to be understood as a duty emanating
from the nature of the law and the nature of the dispute settlement system
22

For discussion of the way in which concessions made are considered the property of the WTO
membership as a whole, see Panel Report, EC – Customs Classification of Certain Computer
Equipment, ¶¶ 45-62, WT/DS62/R (Feb. 5, 1999). For further commentary, see Laurent
Ruessmann, The place of legitimate expectations in the general interpretation of the WTO
Agreements (K.U. Leuven Institute for International Law, Working Paper No. 36, Dec. 2002). The
emphasis on the common expectations of the membership can be traced to the very basis of
normativity in WTO law. In U.S. – Oil Country Tubular Goods, for instance, the Appellate Body
expressed the view that a particular document “[h]as normative value because it provided
administrative guidance and creates expectations among the public and among private actors.” See
Appellate Body Report, U.S. – Oil Country Tubular Goods, ¶ 187, WT/DS268/AB/R (Nov. 29,
2004).

that is oriented, first and foremost, at “settling” disputes. At the same time,
settlement sits in delicate balance with the acknowledged need in the
system to litigate between parties, normally configured as a dyadic pair.
The two activities — “dispute” and “settlement” — are in tension and must
be constantly balanced. The balance is, however, always oriented towards
settlement.
This orientation is confirmed in the opening words of DSU Article 3.7,
which state: “Before bringing a case, a Member shall exercise its judgment
as to whether the action under these procedures would be fruitful. The aim
of the dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a positive solution to a
dispute.”
It has also been affirmed by panels and the Appellate Body. In EC –
Sugar, for instance, the panel observed that: “the procedural rules of WTO
dispute settlement are designed to promote, not the development of
litigation techniques, but the fair, prompt and effective resolution of trade
disputes.23”
And in Australia – Salmon the Appellate Body made clear that the aim
of dispute settlement is “to resolve the matter at issue” and “to secure a
positive solution to a dispute”.24
This duty to settle is at odds with the general orientation of the law in
private law litigation. In Canadian law, for instance, if cooperative duties
are found, they are generally duties that parties owe to the court, not each
other in some abstract, communitarian sense. To be sure, there are various
duties for parties to cooperate in the process of litigation in terms of full
disclosure and civility.25 More generally, perhaps, there is an obligation not
to engage in litigation that is frivolous or vexatious.26 Costs consequences
can be built in to the acceptance or rejection of certain offers. 27
Panel Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar (Complaint by Australia), ¶ 7.6, WT/DS265/R
(Oct. 15, 2004) (emphasis added).
24
See Appellate Body Report, Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon,
WT/DS18/AB/R 223 (Oct. 20, 1998). The principle of judicial economy has to be applied keeping
in mind the aim of the dispute settlement system. This aim is to resolve the matter at issue and “to
secure a positive solution to a dispute”. To provide only a partial resolution of the matter at issue
would be false judicial economy. A panel has to address those claims on which a finding is
necessary in order to enable the DSB to make sufficiently precise recommendations and rulings so
as to allow for prompt compliance by a Member with those recommendations and rulings “in order
to ensure effective resolution of disputes to the benefit of all Members.”
25
In the Canadian province of Ontario, for instance, lawyer conduct is governed by the Rules of
Professional Conduct of the Law Society of Upper Canada.
26
The English doctrine of champerty, for instance, traditionally prevented strangers to lawsuits and
litigants from concluding agreements to maintain, support or promote another person’s lawsuit. See
ROBERT H. ARONSON & DONALD T. WECKSTEIN, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN A NUTSHELL
271 (2d ed., 1991). This has now been modified in some jurisdictions. “An action may be
vexatious if it is obvious that it cannot succeed . . . or if no reasonable person can possibly expect
to obtain relief from it . . . . ” Foy v. Foy (No. 2), 26 O.R. (2d) 220 (C.A.) 227 (1979).
27
In the law of many jurisdictions, the law is structured so as to encourage, but not require, parties
23

Additionally, there are duties on parties not to aggravate the underlying
situation that gives rise to the dispute, such as the doctrine of mitigation in
contract.28 Nevertheless, none of these specific duties amounts to a duty to
settle. Parties are allowed to insist on the scrupulous observance of their
rights.
Why? The explanation for the distinction between WTO and ordinary
domestic litigation lies in the nature of the “community” that the law
creates and contemplates. Domestic private law, in particular, is predicated
upon a view of individuals as autonomous bearers of rights and obligations
that are interchangeable. If one party breaches an agreement or commits a
civil wrong, the solution is damages aimed at making the plaintiff whole.29
In general, no ongoing injury to the remainder of the community is
assumed. In Anglo-American contract law, this doctrine has been taken to
its logical limit in the body of law that privileges damages over specific
performance.30
WTO law is different. It constantly assumes the parties are repeat
players and that they have come together to protect a public “good” which
the law creates via the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) obligation. The
wider, communitarian vision that underlies WTO law is based ultimately
on the fact of economic interdependence. 31 It, too, is probably also the
reason why countries themselves have been relatively uninterested in
reform proposals put forward in the last decade by commentators like Kyle
Bagwell, Petros Mavroidis and Robert Staiger who have suggested, for
instance, that “stronger” remedies, or tradeable rights to retaliate, might be

to settle their differences by means of offers to settle. In many jurisdictions as well, the failure to
accept a reasonable offer can have serious consequences for the instransigent party. For instance,
see Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, Rule 49.10(1) (offers by plaintiffs)
and 49.10(2) (offers by defendant).
28
Mitigation is generally understood to be the doctrine in Anglo-American contract law that bars
the plaintiff from recovering any damages for his or her loss which the claimant could have
avoided. HUGH BEALE, CHITTY ON CONTRACTS: VOL. 1, at 1666 (30th ed., 2008).
29
In tort, for instance, “The general object of an award of damages is to compensate the claimant
for the losses, pecuniary and non-pecuniary, sustained as a result of the defendant’s tort.” CLERK &
LINDSELL ON TORTS 1883 (Anthony M. Dugdale & Michael A. Jones eds., 20th ed., 2010).
30
“[T]he traditional view was that specific performance would not be ordered where damages were
an “adequate” remedy.” BEALE, supra note 28, at 1719.
31
Thus, for instance, in Panel Report, EC – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas, ¶ 7.50, WT/DS27/R/USA (May 22, 1997) the Panel noted concerning rules of standing in
WTO dispute settlement that “with the increased interdependence of the global economy, which
means that actions taken in one country are likely to have significant effects on trade and foreign
direct investment flows in others, Members have a greater stake in enforcing WTO rules than in the
past since any deviation from the negotiated balance of rights and obligations is more likely than
ever to affect them, directly or indirectly. Since the United States is likely to be affected by the EC
regime, it would have an interest in a determination of whether the EC regime is inconsistent with
the requirements of WTO rules. Thus, in our view a Member's potential interest in trade in goods
or services and its interest in a determination of rights and obligations under the WTO Agreement
are each sufficient to establish a right to pursue a WTO dispute settlement proceeding.”

useful in the dispute settlement system.32 On the whole countries appear to
be ready to accept the WTO dispute settlement system as it is. The aim is
not stronger retaliation. Rather, it is to use “the substance of a conflict as a
means of exploring options and establishing responses that are not only
acceptable to all parties but develop and strengthen relationships among
those involved.”33

III. SOME POINTS OF COMPARISON
I have argued above that the character of WTO law and dispute
settlement is exceptional, but not wholly so. There are other legal systems
that emphasize the collective ethos and settlement. To some extent,
settlement might even be deemed a characteristic of all legal systems
inasmuch as law normally contemplates a state of peace among parties
while disputes are the exception.
In international law, for instance, Henry Schermers and Niels Blokker
have observed that members of an international organization are under a
duty to behave as good members, “a duty which can be seen as part of a
modern general principle of law: the duty to cooperate.”34 Jan Klabbers has
also pointed out that this duty is expressed in the constituent treaties of a
number of IOs and goes beyond the usual duty to fulfill treaty obligations
in good faith.35 The problem with such a duty, however, is that it is rarely
specific. There is a need for criteria that might concretize it when expressed
as the duty to settle.
Two potential sources from domestic law are the fields of labour
relations and indigenous treaty talks. In both, a “relational” element
prevails that modifies the negotiating environment.36 The parties’ proximity
and the fact that they will have to continue working together point to a
“public good” framework not unlike the one in WTO law. Parties are under
an obligation to negotiate and settle their disputes in order to safeguard the
peace — or greater good — inherent in their relationship.
In Canadian labour relations law, for instance, a rich jurisprudence has
developed concerning the “duty to bargain”, which is defined by statute in
32
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the Canada Labour Code as follows:
50. Where notice to bargain collectively has been given under
this Part,
(a) the bargaining agent and the employer, without delay, but in
any case within 20 days after the notice was given unless the
parties otherwise agree, shall
(i) meet and commence, or cause authorized representatives on
their behalf to meet and commence, to bargain collectively in
good faith, and
(ii) make every reasonable effort to enter into a collective
agreement.
What is noteworthy about experience under the domestic law of labour
relations is that its principal preoccupations are, as we shall see, strikingly
similar to those found in the duty to settle in WTO law.37 First, there is the
issue of what triggers the duty. This has been held to be notice to bargain
given by either party. Throughout Canada all labour relations statutes
specify the precise timing of such notices.38
A second observation about the labour relations analogy is that the
duty to bargain has been elaborated to prohibit certain specific conduct,
such as misrepresentations, and at times has been interpreted to censure a
party’s entire bargaining stance where a decision-maker concludes that the
real object of the party’s behaviour is to avoid coming to a collective
agreement. Nevertheless, an important point to note here — especially in
the WTO context — is that an underlying philosophy of the duty to bargain
as developed in Canadian labour law is that the duty embraces a “freedom
of contract” rationale. That is, that the parties are best able to determine the
content of their agreements themselves and, failing agreement, each party
has recourse to economic sanctions.39 In particular, Canadian cases reveal a
reluctance among labour tribunals to review the “fairness” of proposals or,
by way of remedy, to impose agreement. Tribunals therefore try to
understand and honour the dynamic of power bargaining. They do not
regard their role as being to redress imbalances of economic power
between the parties. 40 Thus, save in exceptional circumstances, the
requirement of “reasonable efforts” set out in the Canada Labour Code has
generally not been applied to justify a searching review of the
reasonableness of proposals that each side makes but instead has been used
to mandate “rational discussion” and other reasonable procedural rules
37
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which are more likely to lead to a collective agreement.
A third observation is that while the specific statutory formula in
Canadian law varies slightly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, both the duty
of good faith and the duty of reasonable efforts that comprise the duty to
bargain have not been interpreted as a duty to agree or a duty to a
particular bargain.41 Longstanding authority holds that there is no reason
why the subject matter of bargaining should not include anything that is
consistent with the law. 42 As for tactics in the bargaining process, the
highest duty appears to be to preserve the right of each party to safeguard
its freedom respecting its bargaining position and to state its position on the
matters in issue.43 At the same time, decision-makers have taken the view
that such a duty is only amenable to the most minimal legal enforcement,
this being understood as enforcement of the obligation to meet and
exchange positions.44 Tribunals have made it clear that while they do not
condone minimal adherence to standards of good faith bargaining, there is
an overarching concern with writing into the law standards that are
effectively unenforceable or that encourage either minimum bargaining or
litigation.45 Again, as we will see, this concern has clear parallels in WTO
dispute settlement.
A fourth and final observation to be drawn from the experience of
labour relations is that Canadian tribunals have held that there are some
subjects on which bargaining is prohibited. This includes anything that is
expressly contrary to law or what is traditionally considered to be under
unilateral employer control. Thus, for instance, decisions on subcontracting
and plant-closing decisions have been characterized as core management
decisions and complaints based on them liable to dismissal.46
Still, it is doubtful whether such highly evolved requirements of
settlement can be effortlessly transposed into international law. Thus,
another source of analogy for the duty to cooperate and settle, and one that,
given its nature, is perhaps inherently somewhat closer to the model of
WTO dispute settlement, is that of Canada’s recent experience of
negotiations with indigenous peoples. Canada’s territory is home to more
than 600 native tribes, or “bands”, that represent the indigenous peoples
who lived in Canada before the arrival of Europeans.47 In many cases these
41
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peoples negotiated “treaties” with the English or French Crown several
hundred years ago that allowed the government to obtain title to most of
their lands. Each treaty delineated a tract of land which was thought to be
the traditional territory of the First Nation or Nations signing the treaty.48 In
exchange for a surrender of their rights and title to these lands, the First
Nations were promised a smaller parcel of land as a reserve, annual annuity
payments, implements to either farm or hunt and fish, and the right to
continue to hunt and trap, and in some cases fish, on the tract surrendered.
Today these peoples, like the indigenous peoples of Taiwan and
elsewhere, have sought redress for outstanding claims related to these
arrangements in the form of either comprehensive or specific claims. 49
Comprehensive claims deal with the unfinished business of treaty-making
in Canada. These claims arise in areas where Aboriginal land rights have
not been dealt with by past treaties or through other legal means. In these
areas, forward-looking modern treaties are negotiated between the First
Nation(s) in question, Canada and the province or territory. Specific claims
deal with past grievances of First Nations.
In 1973 Canada first established policies on Aboriginal claims, along
with processes and funding for resolving these claims through negotiation.
These are optional processes that provide Aboriginal groups with an
alternative to going to court to resolve their claims. The federal government
takes the position that the claims process is in the best interest of all
Canadians, Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal alike.50 As a result, a number of
negotiations on both comprehensive and specific claims are ongoing and
the amount of land claims concluded to date is substantial.51 The process
has also resulted in a number of new legal concepts, such as recognition of
Aboriginal title and ongoing duties to negotiate among native peoples and
the government.52
The key here is, however, that these arrangements place an emphasis
on negotiation. Parties know that they will be repeat players and will have
to deal with each other on a continuing basis into the future. A modest body
of case law has developed to define, and give content to, the duty to
negotiate. At present, the duty appears to be less well-developed than in the
labour relations context, probably because of the wide-ranging and delicate
issues that the negotiations often touch upon and also because the courts
have shown an awareness of the legacy of aboriginal-government relations,
a legacy marked by both dependency and mistrust.
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In Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests) 53 , for
example, the Supreme Court of Canada recalled that there was
longstanding recognition in Canadian law of a duty on the government to
consult with indigenous people as part of the government’s traditional
fiduciary duty owed to indigenous people.54 More recently, the Supreme
Court has held that the duty to consult and accommodate is founded upon
the honour of the government, which requires public officials, acting
honourably, to participate in processes of negotiation with the view to
effecting reconciliation between the government and Aboriginal people.
In Haida, the Chief Justice of Canada observed that the duty to consult
arises: “[W]hen the Crown [i.e. the government] has knowledge, real or
constructive, of the potential existence of the Aboriginal right or title and
contemplates conduct that might adversely affect it.”55
However, while knowledge of a credible but unproven claim suffices
to trigger a duty to consult and, if appropriate, accommodate, the content of
the duty varies with the circumstances.56 Precisely what is required of the
government may vary with the strength of the claim and the impact of the
contemplated government conduct on the rights at issue. Thus, in a
situation of minimal impact or where the claim to title is weak, “the only
duty on the Crown may be to give notice, disclose information, and discuss
any issues raised”.57 In Haida the Court said that “‘[C]onsultation’ in its
least technical definition is talking together for mutual understanding.”58 At
the opposite end of the spectrum is the situation where the impact is likely
high. Here, “[w]hile precise requirements will vary with the
circumstances”, the Court said that “the consultation required at this stage
may entail the opportunity to make submissions for consideration, formal
participation in the decision-making process, and provision of written
reasons to show that Aboriginal concerns were considered and to reveal the
impact they had on the [final] decision.”59
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In another case, Gitanyow First Nation v. Canada, 60 the hereditary
chiefs of the Gitanyow First Nation, on Canada’s West Coast, brought an
action against the government seeking two declarations with respect to
indigenous treaty negotiations, one of which provided that the federal
government, having undertaken and proceeded to negotiate a treaty with
the Gitanyow, was obliged to negotiate in good faith within the treaty
process and make every effort to conclude a treaty that secures the
Gitanyow rights. The Court granted the first declaration in part, but
observed that since negotiations had yet to commence, “[t]he detailed
content of the [government’s] duty to negotiate in good faith is not
determined at this stage.” It also concluded, however, that in general the
duty to negotiate must include at least the absence of any appearance of
“sharp dealing,” the disclosure of relevant factors, and negotiation “without
oblique motive.”61
IV. THE DUTY TO SETTLE IN WTO LAW: U.S. – SHRIMP AND
U.S. – CONTINUED SUSPENSION
With these examples in mind, we are in a better position to assess what
is actually happening in WTO law and the pronouncements made in
relation to the duty to settle. I propose to look at outcomes in two WTO
cases, U.S. – Shrimp and U.S. – Continued Suspension. These help to
illustrate what issues and considerations have been raised in the actual
practice of WTO dispute settlement.
In U.S. – Shrimp the matter at issue was a challenge by four countries
of Section 609 of U.S. Public Law 101-162 Relating to the Protection of
Sea Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations (the “Revised
Guidelines”). The U.S. law originally required certification, on a countryby-country basis, that shrimping operations were “turtle-friendly”. The U.S.
standard, negotiated with countries in the Western Hemisphere as part of
the Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea
Turtles, was extended to the entire world by a decision of the U.S. Court of
International Trade in 1996. 62 The standard did not take account of
domestic efforts to protect turtles. Rather, it effectively required that all
countries apply the U.S. standard mandating the use of Turtle Excluder
Devices (TEDs). After a WTO finding that the extension amounted to
“unjustifiable discrimination” and “arbitrary discrimination” under the
preamble of GATT Article XX, the United States took a cue from the
Appellate Body’s criticism of its failure to consult with its trading partners
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to conclude an Indian Ocean and South East Asian Marine Turtle
Memorandum of Understanding.63
In U.S. – Continued Suspension the matter at issue arose from an
earlier dispute, EC – Hormones, where the U.S. and Canada challenged an
EC ban on the importation of beef treated with certain growth promoting
hormones. EC – Hormones involved the imposition of a 100% ad valorem
duty by the U.S. and Canada on selected EC food products. 64 The
retaliation remained in place until May 2009 when the U.S. and EU signed
a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the dispute.65 The U.S. – EU
MOU established a phase-in period over several years. In each phase the
U.S. would be entitled to expanded market access for progressively greater
amounts of U.S. High Quality (i.e. hormone-free) beef in the EU in
exchange for a phase-out of the U.S. retaliation. The MOU is scheduled to
conclude in May 2013.
In both U.S. – Shrimp and U.S. – Continued Suspension what was most
notable were not the specific settlements achieved, but the indications made
by panels and the Appellate Body as to what the duty to settle specifically
entails. In addition, collective assistance was evident in the form of
suggestions by other countries as to ways of settling the dispute.
As a result of U.S. efforts at compliance in U.S. – Shrimp, countries
could apply for certification under U.S. law even if they did not require the
use of TEDs. In such cases, a harvesting country had to demonstrate that it
had implemented, and was enforcing, a “comparably effective” regulatory
programme.66 However, on the grounds that the U.S. had not implemented
appropriately the recommendations of the DSB, Malaysia challenged the
U.S. implementation pursuant to DSU Article 21.5 in October 2000.67 The
compliance panel found that:
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[I]n light of the recommendations and rulings of the DSB,
Section 609 of Public Law 101-162, as implemented by the
Revised Guidelines of 8 July 1999 and as applied so far by the
[United States] authorities, is justified under Article XX of the
GATT 1994 as long as the conditions stated in the findings of
this Report, in particular the ongoing serious good faith efforts
to reach a multilateral agreement, remain satisfied.68
It went on to urge:
Malaysia and the United States to cooperate fully in order to
conclude as soon as possible an agreement which will permit
the protection and conservation of sea turtles to the satisfaction
of all interests involved and taking into account the principle
that States have common but differentiated responsibilities to
conserve and protect the environment.69
An appeal of the compliance panel’s decision was launched by
Malaysia in July 2001. The appeal is interesting for its canvassing of
several issues relevant to settlement. Among them were when the
obligation to settle is exhausted, who must agree, and what the relevant
benchmark should be.
Several third parties had concerns that mirror those evidenced in the
shape of domestic law, seen above. Australia objected to the panel report,
saying that the panel erred in its conclusion that simply entering into
negotiations was enough to insulate the U.S. from a claim that it had failed
to engage in good faith negotiations. Something more was required.70 The
EC emphasized that international cooperation “is a process and not a
result.” 71 Such cooperation is necessarily based on reciprocal efforts to
resolve a common concern in the mutual interest. To the EC it therefore
appeared “that international cooperation requires as a minimum the
exchange of data and readily available scientific knowledge between all
interested parties.”72 Japan submitted that “it seems logical to assume that
by engaging in sufficiently ‘serious good faith’ negotiations and meeting
other requirements, the United States has addressed ‘arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination’.” 73 However, Japan went on to observe that
68
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while “the notion of ‘serious’ and ‘good faith’ is subjective in nature, a
more objective test, such as a common recognition by other negotiating
countries on the necessity of the measure in question, may be needed . . .
.”74 Japan considered that the Panel should have explicitly indicated in its
Report whether support for, or recognition of, the revised measure by other
countries would play a part in satisfying the settlement requirement.75
Malaysia had raised two main arguments on appeal:
1. the nature and the extent of the duty to pursue international cooperation
in the protection and conservation of sea turtles, and
2. the flexibility of the Revised Guidelines. Malaysia’s position, as
appellant, was that “demonstrating serious, good faith efforts to
negotiate an international agreement for the protection and
conservation of sea turtles is not sufficient to meet the requirements of
the chapeau of Article XX.”76
Malaysia maintained that the chapeau required instead the conclusion
of such an international agreement.
With respect to the first issue the Appellate Body took the position that
to avoid “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” as per the chapeau of
Article XX, the United States had to provide all exporting countries
“similar opportunities to negotiate” an international agreement. 77 In
particular, it stated that:
[G]iven the specific mandate contained in Section 609, and
given the decided preference for multilateral approaches voiced
by WTO Members and others in the international community in
various international agreements for the protection and
conservation of endangered sea turtles that were cited in our
previous Report, the United States, in our view, would be
expected to make good faith efforts to reach international
agreements that are comparable from one forum of negotiation
to the other.78
However, the Appellate Body also stated that “the negotiations need
not be identical.”79 It added:
[N]o two negotiations can ever be identical, or lead to identical
results. Yet the negotiations must be comparable in the sense
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that comparable efforts are made, comparable resources are
invested, and comparable energies are devoted to securing an
international agreement. So long as such comparable efforts are
made, it is more likely that “arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination” will be avoided . . . . 80
At the same time, the Appellate Body took a moderate position on the
issue of whether or not the obligation to negotiate included a duty to
conclude a settlement. It stated:
Requiring that a multilateral agreement be concluded by the
United States in order to avoid “arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination” in applying its measure would mean that any
country party to the negotiations with the United States,
whether a WTO Member or not, would have, in effect, a veto
over whether the United States could fulfill its WTO
obligations. Such a requirement would not be reasonable. For a
variety of reasons, it may be possible to conclude an agreement
with one group of countries but not another.81
The Appellate Body also disagreed with the panel that successful
efforts by the U.S. to conclude an Inter-American Convention could in any
way be considered a legal “benchmark”, or in other words, an objective
standard. Instead, the Appellate Body focused on the particulars of the
negotiations, observing that even though the projected agreement was
voluntary (as opposed to legally binding) and not concluded at the time of
the original compliance proceedings, the U.S. had actively undertaken
negotiations and supported them financially. 82 The Inter-American
Convention was useful as an “example” 83 but differences in “factual
circumstances have to be kept in mind.”84
A second issue was flexibility: to what extent did the alleged
“unilateral” measure of the U.S. have to be made pliant to other countries’
standards? Here, the neat question was whether flexibility in question was
in relation to both means and results. The Appellate Body stated:
[T]here is an important difference between conditioning market
access on the adoption of essentially the same programme, and
conditioning market access on the adoption of a programme
80
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comparable in effectiveness. Authorizing an importing Member
to condition market access on exporting Members putting in
place regulatory programmes comparable in effectiveness to
that of the importing Member gives sufficient latitude to the
exporting Member with respect to the programme it may adopt
to achieve the level of effectiveness required. It allows the
exporting Member to adopt a regulatory programme that is
suitable to the specific conditions prevailing in its territory.85
On this basis, and the fact that the U.S.’s revised legislation allowed
for consideration of the specific circumstances in any exporting country,
the Appellate Body concluded that “the Revised Guidelines, on their face,
permit a degree of flexibility that, in our view, will enable the United States
to consider the particular conditions prevailing in Malaysia . . . .”86
A second case of interest to the obligation to settle is U.S. – Continued
Suspension.87 This was a case that, on its face, was very different from
U.S. – Shrimp. Here the underlying dispute was considerably more mature.
Positions had hardened and it might naturally be thought that the
achievement of a settlement would be more difficult.
The specific “matter” in U.S. – Continued Suspension was provoked by
certain actions of the EC to resolve the EC – Hormones dispute. That
dispute, it will be recalled, had formally ended in April 1999 with WTO
authorization to the U.S. and Canada to retaliate against the EC because of
its failure to remove an import ban on hormone-treated beef. The Appellate
Body held that the original ban failed to comply with SPS Article 5.1,
which required the EC to conduct a risk assessment. In June 2003 the EC
withdrew the original ban but immediately replaced it with legislation that
continued to have the same effect. In the meantime, however, retaliation by
the U.S. and Canada continued. The EC brought the Continued Suspension
case on the basis that both the U.S. and Canada had failed to remove their
retaliation despite the EC’s alleged removal of inconsistent measures, the
unilateral determinations by both the U.S. and Canada that the replacement
legislation was a continuing WTO violation, and the alleged failure of the
U.S. and Canada to follow WTO dispute settlement procedures in
continuing the ban.
Of particular concern in U.S. – Continued Suspension was the silence
of DSU Article 22.8 on the termination of WTO retaliation. Who is entitled

85

Id. ¶ 144. (emphasis in original).
Id. ¶ 147.
87
U.S. – Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC – Hormones Dispute, WT/DS320. Its
companion case is Canada – Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC – Hormones Dispute,
WT/DS321 (Mar. 31, 2008).
86

to make a determination that compliance has been achieved? The
complainant? The defendant? WTO dispute settlement? And what
obligations rest upon the parties to try and resolve disputes once retaliation
has begun?
The procedural sequence of the case was a request by the EC for the
establishment of a panel in January 2005. A panel report was issued in
March 2008.88 This was appealed and an Appellate Body report rendered in
October 2008.89 The Appellate Body began its analysis by observing the
process-driven nature of WTO dispute settlement. WTO dispute settlement
is conceived of as “a continuum of events” and cases alternate between
dispute settlement and the DSB until substantive compliance is achieved.90
However, the Appellate Body also observed that:
This does not mean that Members can remain passive once
concessions have been suspended pursuant to the DSB's
authorization. The requirement that the suspension of
concessions must be temporary indicates that the suspension of
concessions, as the last resort available under the DSU when
compliance is not achieved, is an abnormal state of affairs that
is not meant to remain indefinitely.91
In particular, the Appellate Body observed that:
Members must act in a cooperative manner so that the normal
state of affairs, that is, compliance with the covered agreements
and absence of the suspension of concessions, may be restored
as quickly as possible. Thus, both the suspending Member and
the implementing Member share the responsibility to ensure
that the application of the suspension of concessions is
“temporary”. . . . Where, as in this dispute, an implementing
measure is taken and Members disagree as to whether this
measure achieves substantive compliance, both Members have a
duty to engage in WTO dispute settlement in order to establish
whether the conditions in Article 22.8 have been met and
whether, as a consequence, the suspension of concessions must
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be terminated.92
As to how this obligation to cooperate is to be activated, the Appellate
Body stated:
[DSU] Article 21.5 does not indicate which party may initiate
proceedings under this provision. Rather, the language of the
provision is neutral on this matter, and it is open to either party
to refer the matter to an Article 21.5 panel to resolve this
disagreement. The text of Article 21.5, therefore, leaves open
the possibility that either party to the original dispute may
initiate the proceedings.93
Thus, an underlying idea of collectivity and the communitarian value
of prompt resolution prevails over continued suspension, implying that the
obligation to end retaliation is a shared responsibility. And here a certain
“mixing” occurs, a mixity that is perhaps best displayed in the Appellate
Body’s comments as to the burden of proof. The usual rule as to the burden
of proof in WTO law is stated in U.S. – Shirts and Blouses as follows: “[I]t
is a generally accepted canon of evidence in civil law, common law and, in
fact, most jurisdictions, that the burden of proof rests upon the party,
whether complaining or defending, who asserts the affirmative of a
particular claim or defence.”94
In U.S. – Continued Suspension the usual rule appears to be modified:
Much of the reluctance of the parties to secure a definitive
determination in respect of Article 22.8 is the apprehension that,
upon initiation, a party will attract the full burden of proof . . . .
In our view, the allocation of the burden of proof, in the context
of Article 22.8, should not be determined simply on the basis of
a mechanistic rule that the party who initiates the proceedings
bears the burden of proof. As we have indicated, in case of a
disagreement, both parties are under an obligation to secure a
definitive multilateral determination as to whether the
suspension of concessions must be terminated. The burden of
proof does not attach to a party simply because such party
discharges this obligation. To hold otherwise would create a
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disincentive to act in a manner which we consider to be
obligatory and desirable.95
These comments appear to reinforce the idea that settlement is a joint
obligation of all the parties to a WTO dispute, and in some sense, of the
WTO membership as a whole. This is reflected in the fact that there is
considerable discussion in U.S. – Continued Suspension of the obligation to
“have recourse to” and “abide by” WTO dispute settlement procedures in
accordance with DSU Article 23 — itself a multilateral process.96 Where a
disagreement arises as to whether a measure found to be in violation has
been removed, the Appellate Body indicated that “this disagreement must
be resolved through Article 21.5 proceedings”.97 Obviously, in the normal
course, the original violator bears the burden of proving that the violation
has in fact been removed, although the Appellate Body concluded that
“[t]his does not mean that [the original complainants] do not have an
obligation to engage in the dispute settlement procedures in a cooperative
manner.”98

V. CONCLUSION
Decisions in both U.S. – Shrimp and U.S. – Continued Suspension
reveal that the duty to settle in WTO dispute settlement is a plurilateral, and
to some extent multilateral, one. The duty rests in the first instance on the
shoulders of the litigants but is also subject to multilateral review by the
entire WTO membership under DSU Article 3.6. To date, few cases have
formally raised the issue of review, probably because settlement practices
are most often subject to “horse-trading” in the DSB.99 This activity also
tends to blur the permissive/prohibitive distinction to settlement seen in
domestic labour law.100 Nevertheless, a focus on settlement helps to correct
U.S. – Continued Suspension Appellate Body Report, supra note 89 ¶ 359-60 (italics added).
DSU Article 23 requires that WTO members have exclusive recourse to, and abide by, WTO
dispute settlement results.
97
U.S. – Continued Suspension Appellate Body Report, supra note 89, ¶ 389.
98
Id. ¶ 409 (emphasis added).
99
The structure of the DSU suggests that there is some intention to exercise multilateral
surveillance of the solutions that are arrived at. This surveillance has in fact happened in several
high-profile cases such as EC – Bananas where direct challenges have resulted to the settlements
reached, but the reality is that surveillance takes time and resources are limited. It is probably
impossible today for any one WTO member country to keep tabs on every settlement being
concluded in the WTO legal system. We have to presume that only cursory attention is being paid
and that a substantial amount is probably slipping through the WTO compliance net.
100
A number of settlements arising out of WTO dispute settlement in fact have been WTOinconsistent. A particularly illustrative example is that of the Canada – U.S. Lumber dispute, which
began in March 2001 at the time of the expiration of the pre-existing Softwood Lumber Agreement
between Canada and the U.S.. The expiration provoked a flurry of litigation in the WTO and
elsewhere. The Government of Canada challenged different aspects of the DOC’s determinations
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the (mis)impression that WTO law and WTO dispute settlement are only
— or even primarily — about disputes.
I have argued in this article that the entire ethos of WTO law is heavily
permeated with the obligation to settle and to observe obligations. This is a
by-product of the law in question, a law established for the benefit of the
membership as a whole. In U.S. – Continued Suspension the aversion to
disputes disruptive of obligations was referred to by the Appellate Body,
which termed the suspension of concessions “temporary” and “an abnormal
state of affairs that is not meant to remain indefinitely”. Frequently,
however, our attention to the “fireworks” of individual cases diverts
attention away from this important goal. Often, we see WTO litigation
purely in terms of litigation rather than the long-term aims it is meant to
promote.
The emerging law of settlement emphasizes that while the duty to
settle might be conceived of as largely procedural if appropriate domestic
law analogies are accessed, in WTO law there has been some elaboration of
what the duty entails substantively. It consists of a “soft” duty to negotiate,
but as was pointed out in U.S. – Shrimp, this appears to involve more than
simply entering into negotiations. Countries will be required to exchange
data and readily available scientific knowledge, and to listen to each other’s
positions. Although the case law has not dealt with this specific question
yet, it is probable that some degree of failure to engage might amount to
bad faith in WTO law.
At the same time, the duty to negotiate a settlement cannot be
converted into a duty to agree. As was noted in U.S. – Shrimp, maintaining
that a duty to negotiate is the same as a duty to agree gives a potential
holdout the power to veto a country’s compliance with the WTO
Agreement.
What of objective benchmarks? Where do we find reasonable
standards for what settlement requires? In U.S. – Shrimp the Appellate
Body emphasized the point that:

under the WTO Agreement and NAFTA Ch. 19, Canadian lumber producers challenged the U.S.
decision not to refund anti-dumping duties as a violation of NAFTA Ch. 11, and both the
Government of Canada and the Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports, part of the U.S. lumber lobby,
engaged in follow-up litigation before U.S. courts. See Chi Carmody, International Decisions,
100(3) AM. J. INTL L. 664, 664-674 (2006). On 12 October 2006 the U.S. and Canada informed the
DSB that they had reached a mutually agreed solution to all of their WTO litigation. In light of this
mutually agreed solution, WTO action was withdrawn. This was despite the fact that the settlement
reached was WTO-inconsistent in the sense that it imposed restrictions on imports of Canadian
softwood lumber in violation of free trade commitments. Agreement on Safeguards, art. 11.1(b),
Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 154, states that “a [WTO] Member shall not seek, take or maintain
any voluntary export restraints, orderly marketing arrangements or any other similar measures on
the export or the import side.” See also General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1994), art. XI,
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187.

[N]o two negotiations can ever be identical, or lead to identical
results. Yet the negotiations must be comparable in the sense
that comparable efforts are made, comparable resources are
invested, and comparable energies are devoted to securing an
international agreement. So long as such comparable efforts are
made, it is more likely that “arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination” will be avoided between countries where an
importing Member concludes an agreement with one group of
countries, but fails to do so with another group of countries.101
The Appellate Body was, however, reluctant to term what the U.S. had
entered into with other countries a hard “benchmark”. Rather, it was
referred to as an “example”. Still, in the circumstances of marine
conservation it observed that “a multilateral approach is strongly preferred.
Yet it is one thing to prefer a multilateral approach . . . it is another to
require the conclusion of a multilateral agreement . . . . ”102 Thus, there
appears to be an important contextual element to settlement under the WTO
Agreement, one which encourages the striking of a balance between
bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral tensions underlying the treaty and
depending on the subject matter involved.
The domestic law example of the duty to negotiate is helpful because it
provides some idea of what WTO law might look like in future. Domestic
labour law is much more developed than WTO law. It features, for
instance, strict timelines about the duty to bargain, yet even here, courts are
reluctant to impose settlements on parties. There is respect for the
underlying power dynamic, something the organs of WTO dispute
settlement appear to be acutely conscious of. What is perhaps most
interesting in cases like U.S. – Shrimp is the way that other countries
participating as third parties — Australia, the EC, Japan — appeared to
contribute to a solution sotto voce by identifying issues and offering
interpretations and solutions. There is, in other words, a communitarian
aspect to the legal result.
Thus, what the law of settlement in the WTO emphasizes is a need for
countries to be actively involved with, or what Martti Koskenniemi has
referred to “authentically committed” to, international law.103 Many legal
systems foresee this kind of behaviour as the only one that will allow the
law to work. There are fine limits to what written laws will achieve if the
U.S. – shrimp Appellate Body Report, supra note 70, ¶ 122 (emphasis in original).
Id. ¶ 124.
103
MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA 546 (2005). Koskenniemi says that
authentic commitment, or what can be termed an “ethic of responsibility”, involves three features:
“1. the accountability of each for the choices one makes, 2. the exercise of discretionary power so
as [to] take account and fairly assess the widest range of consequences of one’s acts, and 3.
responsiveness to the claims of others.”
101
102

spirit of the laws is not observed. In the Dao deching it is said that “the
more laws are promulgated, the greater the number of thieves [Fa Ling Tzu
Chang Tao Chei To Yu ].”104
The aphorism can be interpreted in a variety of ways. One way is to
recognize that beyond a certain stage the formal law is exhausted and what
becomes important is li (禮), “variously defined, in its totality, as ‘moral
law’, as ‘customary, uncodified law, internalized by individuals’, as ‘the
concrete institutions and the accepted modes of behaviour in a civilized
state’, as the ‘moral and social rules of conduct’, as ‘propriety’ and as the
‘courtesy, customs and traditions we come to share . . . following the
human Way’.” 105 Patrick Glenn has observed that “li is not passive
deference to external patters. It is a making of society that requires the
investment of oneself and one’s own sense of importance.”106 So too with
WTO law. The duty to settle stems from the need for countries to truly
apply themselves to the process of making — and remaking — an
international community expressed through law, and in the process,
deepening and strengthening the bonds of those who are part of it.

104

DAO DECHING, Ch. 57, Sentence 3.
H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 328 (2010). Li is often contrasted with
fa (法), the formal, codified law regarded in Confucian legal thinking as fixed and inflexible.
106
Id. at 327.
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